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“I have always been in the standards business.”  - Bill Gates 1991 
 
“[Standardization] is not a linear, straightforward or cumulative process. Iterative cycles and 
wasted efforts are very usual. I think "chaotic" is a more appropriate word [for the description of 
the development process] than "predictable" or "planned". This naturally makes the ability to 
operate in such an environment and ability to understand the process even more important.” 
Participant of 3G standardization 2000 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Standards have continued to play an increasingly important role within information and 
communication technology (ICT) as it has become networked, ubiquitous and complex. Multiple 
theories that have been suggested within the areas of economics, sociology, and management can 
be used to analyze portions of ICT standardization processes. Their limitation is that they pay 
scant attention to either the technological innovation and exploration inherent in ICT activity or 
to the institutional aspects of standard enforcement and exploitation (March, Sproull, and Tamuz 
1991) necessary for successful adoption. Consequently, they often fail to analyze all of the 
necessary events and settings that influence ICT standard emergence as a dynamic process. 
In this article we propose a process model of standardization that helps analyze ICT 
standard emergence as a  dynamic process.  We conceive standardization to be a process of 
creating a technical standard and (possibly) diffusing it into the market place. A standard is 
understood as a set of technical specifications adhered to by a set of producers, either tacitly or as 
a result of a formal agreement (David and Greenstein 1990, p.4). The process of standard 
creation integrates the following three intertwined activities: 1) creation of artifacts that can meet 
a set of requirements embedded in the standard and formulated by the involved actors; 2) a 
possible deviation from the current technological trajectory in the form of innovation that opens 
a new (cognitive) design space; and 3) a mobilization of a set of actors that are willing to follow 
and embrace such deviations and solutions. A faithful account of standardization processes must 
rely upon a multi-theoretical framework that integrates these three activities. We suggest that 
such a framework can be developed by drawing on Simon’s theory of design (Simon 1981), the 
Weickian concept of sense-making (Weick 1995) and the Actor-Network theory’s (ANT) idea of 
mobilization and negotiation within socio-technical networks (Latour 1995; Callon and Law 
1989).  These three theoretical lenses help integrate models of design and negotiated agreements 
that align actors’ interests, along with the  “reading” of new meanings into designs, into the 
analysis of standardization processes. 
We use the proposed framework to examine standardization processes in the dynamic 
field of telecommunications (Schmidt and Werle 1998; West 2000, Bekkers 2001, Bekkers and 
Smits 1998, Hanseth, Monteiro and Halting 1996) by exploring three standardization cases. We 
demonstrate how an analysis of ICT standardization processes can benefit from simultaneously 
capturing the activities of design, sense-making, and negotiation. Our analysis shows that 
standardization processes unfold necessarily as a dynamic interplay of these three recursively 
organized activities. Future standardization studies should therefore be open to theorizing over 
complex processes by drawing upon multiple theoretical bodies. 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review several 
streams of literature on standardization and analyze their strengths and weaknesses.  In Section 3, 
we outline the theoretical ingredients of the process model of standardization and discuss the 
critical activities of design, sense-making, and negotiation. We also show how they unfold 
dynamically and recursively.  Next, in section 4 we investigate three standardization episodes 
using the multi-theoretical lenses of the standardization model and show how each type of 
activity is required in order to achieve closure in the standardization process and how these 
activities are dynamically triggered. Section 5 includes a discussion of the theoretical 
implications of the proposed process model and how it can be used in future research.  Finally, 
Section 6 comprises a summary of the paper. 
 
 
Standardization Research Issues 
 
ICT Standardization Defined 
ICT standardization can be defined as the process by which two or more actors come to 
agree upon and adhere to a set of technical specifications of an ICT system, its parts or its 
functionality, either tacitly or as a result of a formal contract (David and Greenstein 1990). 
Hence, ICT standards concurrently enable and constrain the behavior of various actors in the 
future (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2000). To achieve such an agreement, actors must do the 
following:  signal their willingness to develop a standard; participate in formulating the principal 
concept and scope of the standard that makes sense for them; agree on the exact content and 
form of the standard; develop a contractual agreement for “gives” and “takes” in relation to 
standardization process and its outcomes; and agree upon what conforming to the standard 
specification actually means.  The form and content of these activities may vary. Further, not all 
of them are necessarily carried out during the standardization process (Schmidt and Werle 1998). 
During any of these steps, some or all actors may fail for a variety of reasons. The 
process spans several contexts that range from laboratories and R&D departments to marketing 
negotiations that deal with intellectual property rights, brand names and so forth. Thus 
standardization, through its promise to coordinate multiple activities that help move new ICT 
technologies successfully to markets, can erect vast arenas of coordination that need to connect a 
myriad of actors, artifacts and locations over time and space (Jørgensen and Sørensen 1999). 
The actors’ motivation for engaging in ICT standardization is high. Those who are 
successful in setting ICT standards seize significant competitive advantages and reap monopoly 
rents, while firms that are locked out of the standardization process or remain laggards face 
significant difficulties (Schilling 1998). Recently, traditional institutional forms of ICT 
standardizing have become rife with problems and cannot cope with the increased scope, pace 
and complexity of the standardization processes (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2000; Schmidt 
and Werle 1998; Werle 2000). ICT standard setting has become a risky proposition as many such 
processes fail and do not meet actors’ expectations. The typical questions raised in the new 
situation may include the following: How do successful standards emerge in the ICT? How are 
competitive advantages accrued from adhering to them? How are they chosen and maintained so 
that they can enlist a sufficient number of followers and become successful? What processes and 
institutional forms does one need to put in place to create successful ICT standards? What 
institutional or contingent events and factors influence the creation of ICT standards? These 
research questions have posed considerable challenges to researchers in several areas for 
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consequent theory building about standardization including innovation and organization theory, 
management, economics, and the sociology of technology. 
The complexity and dynamism of ICT standardization set specific challenges for theory 
building. Concepts must be open-ended, but at the same time sufficiently exact to capture the 
essential features of the standardization processes and their outcomes.  They should help us 
become sensitized to the specifics of standardization and analyze processes that are emergent, 
chaotic, and involve multiple elements (technical, managerial, economic, social etc.).  Critical 
issues that these concepts should help highlight include those listed here: 1) standardization 
processes result in agreements concerning technical artifacts that are open to challenge at any 
point of time; 2) standardization processes are complex and involve multiple heterogeneous 
activities that include decision making and technical construction, 3) standardization processes 
unfold over time, space and across diverse sets of actors who  do not necessarily share similar 
interests. We shall analyze three streams of standardization research that have sought to 
understand standardization processes and their outcomes. In this context, standardization is 
viewed in terms of either design tasks, social sense-making challenges or negotiation problems. 
ICT Standardization as innovation and product development process. An obvious 
approach to examining standardization is to view it as a form of design that results in innovation. 
In this case, standardization theory can be derived from the literature dealing with innovation and 
product development. The major question here is then, how should producers organize specific 
activities so as to enable an effective design (innovation) of the technical specifications? Not 
surprisingly, due to its close similarities to traditional R&D, many view ICT standardization 
processes primarily as innovation processes (Miller and Morris 1999; Rothwell 1994), a linear 
movement from basic research to product design, manufacturing and introduction (Miller and 
Morris 1999). More recent models introduced overlapping stages and recognized the influential 
role of external parties in affecting the process logic and outcomes. The strength of these models 
is that they cover the whole innovation process from basic research to technology introduction. 
The weakness of these models is that they lack the concepts needed to identify and analyze 
intricate events that influence standardization outcomes. Hence, while such models are 
analytically compelling, they fail to describe the emergent features of standardization that are 
part of the standard setter’s experience (Autio 1997) and lack the concepts required to understand 
the internal logic through which the process becomes enacted and subsequently results in 
specific outcomes. 
Another group of process models that lend themselves to analyzing standardization 
processes are those in which product development is modeled as a sequence of phases that are 
separated by gates representing go/no go decisions (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1996; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1988; Cooper 1983, 1993).  Such “water-fall” models have been widely adopted in 
several engineering disciplines and have been particularly popular in ICT areas like software 
engineering. (Iivari and Koskela 1987; Royce 1970)  In these models, an ICT product is 
observed as it is developed through a linear sequence of steps, though recently the need for 
backtracking and recursion has been identified (Iivari 1990, 1990) when high uncertainty and 
product volatility prevail. They do not, however, recognize the multiple stakeholders involved in 
standardization and the need for finding a common ground for their standardization. 
ICT Standardization as a decision problem. Another stream of research on 
standardization has focused on events and rationalities, which guide standard related decision-
making among a set of producers. This is driven by the questions, why did producers choose a 
specific standard, and what would have been the most rational outcome for  such a choice? Most 
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of this is informed by economic theory. In economics, the early literature approached 
standardization as a rational game between the involved actors (Besen and Farrell 1994). Based 
on these game theoretic models, the actors’ decision to create a separate standard, or to join a 
standardization initiative, was analyzed using utility models and drawing welfare implications 
from alternative decision choices (Farrell and Saloner 1988). Another stream has been concerned 
with the diffusion of ICT and the factors that explain the emergence of de facto standards as a 
result of actors’autonomous decision-making. These models are often based on the notion of 
increasing returns (Arthur 1989). They can describe how a specific ICT system gains a lead in 
the installed base of the technology due to correct timing as well as random events. In the 
management literature, research has focused on analogous problems of dominant design 
competition and bandwagon processes (Tushman and Anderson 1986; Wade 1995).  Both these 
areas view standards as products that have entered in the market place. They consequently ignore 
the ambiguity that precedes the decision phase. In both areas, scant attention has been paid to the 
processes through which technology specifications emerge and to the factors that influence 
search and discovery. The research has also largely neglected  the subsequent processes of 
getting the actors to decide which of these processes involves negotiation and enrollment. 
Socio-technical studies of standardization.Relatively disconnected from the innovation-
driven and economic literatures of standardization, a socio-technical literature has emerged 
during the last two decades (Williams and Edge 1996; Hanseth, Monteiro, and Halting 1996) 
often called the social construction of technology research (SCOT). This stream examines 
standardization as a form of social interaction within a network of actors in which the technology 
becomes introduced and stabilized in the social system. In this case, researchers have asked the 
questions, why and how was a specific ICT standard created and what social and technical issues 
influenced its creation? How did the involved actors understand the meaning of the design and 
what reasons did they have for their enrollment in standardization processes? How did specific 
actors become connected through artifacts and commitments during the process and why? 
Accordingly, research in this stream analyzes why the standardization process follows one 
trajectory while excluding others and attempts to answer why the standardized technology has 
adopted its shape (Mangematin and Callon 1995). 
These studies often trace down the decisions and commitments that actors had to make 
when their alignment of interests was at stake in the use and introduction of the technology. Yet, 
successful alignment is but one possible outcome of the negotiation (Callon, Latour, and Rip 
1986; Callon and Law 1989; Latour 1993) and failures of technologies are likely to occur 
because the network does not stabilize. Social-technical network literature thus complements the 
economic literature and provides a processual account of the building of the socio-technical 
network related to standardization actors. It pays attention to the necessary measures and 
activities that can stabilize the network. At the same time, it often fails to provide an adequate 
description of the cognitive and technical challenges related to standardization outcomes. It often 
does not account for rationalities involved in actors’ decision making, i.e. why a specific choice 
was made or how a design was produced. 
Open issues in Standardization Research. Each research stream offers specific insights 
into standardization. Innovation process models help analyze how activities become organized 
over time and depict their inherent dynamism through the concepts of recursion and 
backtracking.  Decision theory  helps analyze choice rationalities and how such choices in 
specific sequences may result in different outcomes. Finally the socio-technical models raise the 
issues of meaning, negotiation and actor enrollment. The strengths of each model can be 
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integrated into a broader process model of standardization for a more faithful analysis. We must 
accordingly identify activities that embrace all these dimensions of standardization. Moreover, 
we need a way to organize these activities through the constructs that account for observed 
variations in standardization processes. 
 
 
Standardization as a Multi-Threaded Social Activity 
 
Standardization as Design, Sense-Making and Negotiation 
The standardization process by necessity includes the activities of design (D), sense-
making (S), and negotiation (N) and thereby needs to be analyzed as a process that results in a 
specific design outcome that exhibits a technical “closure” (technical specification).  This closure 
is connected at all times to broader community level processes of creating significance structures 
(sense-making) and aligning interests among actors that enter the standardization arena 
(negotiation).  These elements are outlined in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
 
Attaching meaning to
design alternatives
Agreeing between designs,
fixing the actor network
Sense-making
Creating and choosing design alternatives
Design
Negotiation
 
 
Figure 1.  Standardization Activities 
 
 
First and foremost, developing a “technical specification” – a standard – is about 
designing a technical artifact (D-element). The specification contained in the standard represents 
the generation  and evaluation of choice among technical alternatives and their 
functionality/ability to reach a closure in the technical specification (Williams and Edge 1996).  
For example, the design of a mobile phone standard involves the pain-staking process of 
designing an overall architecture for the system, all interfaces and their functionality between 
different components and their non-functional features (like reliability). The concept of 
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standardization as design focuses on the cognitive tasks of how to articulate alternatives, make 
choices among them and evaluate them under conditions of bounded rationality. 
At the same time, any investigation of standardization needs to recognize its social and 
community dependent nature. As the definition suggests, a standard is formed on the agreement 
between two or more actors. For example, in the case of mobile phone standards, the actors must 
observe who can or should enter into the agreement about the standard, why, and under what 
conditions. Therefore, concepts mobilized in order to analyze standardization must describe 
necessary social activities that identify and enroll actors (producers) and conditions under which 
they can reach an agreement (Hanseth, Monteiro, and Halting 1996). Standardization studies 
must describe interactions between actors that may or may not share joint interests. They also 
have to demonstrate how the design of standards is contingent upon and influenced by the 
surrounding and preceding social processes of “reaching an agreement.” This requires the 
capability to provide reasons for doing so for each involved actor. Accordingly, we need to 
conceptualize standardization in the “context” of design as a set of related activities that lead us 
to understand what is articulated between actors and why and how they reach agreements as a 
result of these communications. 
Reaching an agreement on design requires that involved actors are able to make sense of 
the designs, other actors and the environment. This we call the sense-making element (S-
element). For example, in the case of mobile telephony actors must be able to foresee a world 
where a mobile phone and its use make sense (is plausible) by some set of actors and at the same 
time create meanings attached to that technology (like business-like, expression of freedom etc.). 
Such sense-making implies that actors create and enact new frames of reference and significance 
that will be attached to the technology. This process involves articulating and interpreting 
beliefs, cognitive elements, standards of evaluation and behaviors that frame subsequent design 
activity (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1993; Karnoe and Garud 2001).  In addition, standardization 
researchers must analyze how emerging designs and their interpretations between actors become 
shaped and contested in negotiations due to actors’ conflicting interests (N-element).  For 
example, in the case of mobile telephony different actors may have different interests and 
associated ideas regarding the extent to which mobile telephony is or should be different from 
established modes of uses and meanings attached to wire-line telephony. Without the idea of 
actors’ different “interests” and contrasting ways to make-sense there would be no need to 
“reach” an agreement. Thus, standards as agreements entail that actors negotiate meanings 
related to the technology and, during such negotiations, recognize and reconcile their diverging 
interests. Hence, negotiation is needed as the third element of standardization activity. 
It is important to understand that each activity (D, S, or N) is dependent upon the other 
two. None of them can proceed without the support of other activities at an actor’s disposal: 
discovering a new or deviating course of action through design is always subsumed within the 
idea of a new interpretation of the design context and the obligation of getting others to agree to 
go along with it.  Hence, the focus on a designer’s cognitive design behavior in Simon’s (1977) 
design model needs to be expanded in standardization analyses to include concepts of sense-
making within participating communities (Weick 1995) and negotiation where their interests are 
continually aligned (Latour 1995). Successful standardization accordingly implies a closure in 
each of the following: 1) obtaining a design contained in the standard that meets normal 
requirements set for technical specifications and can embed novel technological elements; 2) 
involved actors understand the standard and its implications for their going concerns and they 
can imagine scenarios in which the standard is illustrated; and 3) involved actors reach an 
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agreement that can stabilize and mobilize a socio-technical network implied by the standard. 
Each one of these is, however, continually open to re-evaluation and challenge in terms of a 
potentially better design, emergence of a novel and surprising meaning or an unexpected 
breakdown where interests are not reconciled or actors do not agree. Such failures normally 
imply that a new round of standardization involving design, sense-making and negotiation is 
initiated to re-align all activities and their outcomes. 
 
Standardization as an Emergent, Recursive Process 
The three activities of standardization may become related in myriad ways. Concepts that 
describe connections between activities must help organize them in a dynamic and hierarchical 
order. We adopt recursion from Simon’s seminal work (1977) to provide a framework to 
organize standardization activities. Simon describes recursion in decision-making as follows: 
“problems at any given level generate sub-problems that, in turn, have their intelligence, design, 
and choice phases, and so on” (Simon 1977, p.43). We can observe that he does not impose any 
specific order in which the three activities are carried out. Second, the activities can be broken 
down into any set of hierarchical levels that embed these three processes. Third, actors can 
engage concurrently in several activities, jump back between them or omit some activities 
entirely at certain moments. If we replace the intelligence, design and choice above with design, 
sense-making and negotiation as the three recursively organized activities of standardization, we 
ascertain that there is no specific order in which D-, S- and N elements can be organized. 
Second, the outcome of any activity can be broken down into lower level activities which can 
also serve as input to any other activity including the activity itself. This also implies direct 
recursion. For example, one can design a design, or negotiate how to negotiate. Third, each actor 
can be engaged in several activities at any point of time and withdraw from some of these 
activities as well. 
We show how this model can be integrated with the product oriented innovation models 
of standardization. It provides examples of each standardization activity within each innovation 
stage. The table also covers a product (or in our case standard) introduction and adoption step 
called “Market Introduction and Adoption,” which addresses the need to understand customer-
related agreements that fit our definition of a standard. 
The concept of inherent recursion of standardization activities has specific implications 
for the analysis of standardization. First, during the analysis one of the activities is always placed 
on the foreground while the others remain as a necessary backdrop. This covers the engaged 
actors as well as the researchers analyzing the situation. This focus can be changed by the 
involved actors and the observant researchers if required and generally results in a new and 
different direction for the process. Hence, at each step (actors can make a choice and change the 
direction of the process by changing the activity and the analysis must lead to the  identification 
of such moments and understand the occurrence of such outcomes. An additional feature of the 
model is its indifference to the chosen units of analysis and granularity of activities that follows 
from the hierarchical organization. 
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 Design Sense-making Negotiation 
Initiation Decision to engage or to 
retreat from design 
Setting up the goals and 
constraints that define the 
design space 
Creating a joint 
understanding of why a 
standard is beneficial to 
different actors 
Defining the meaning of the 
technological 
Artifacts embedded in the 
standard 
 
Reconciling the concept of 
the standard with incentives 
of the participating parties 
 
Requirements 
discovery 
Setting the standards 
requirements and functional / 
architectural features 
Setting the scope of the 
innovation and defining its 
nature and functionality in 
the possible use context 
Reconciling actors’ technical 
abilities with their vision of 
the scope of the innovation 
Resource 
allocation 
Resource planning and 
commitment 
Developing a vision of 
general resources needed and 
developing a sense of the 
complexity and uncertainty 
involved 
Creating options on benefits' 
and how resources are 
distributed 
Specifications 
development 
Designing the specifications 
for each functionality and 
feature of the specified 
standard 
Making sense of 
technological alternatives and 
their implications for artifact 
construction 
Negotiating between 
competing technical solutions 
and   resolving related IPRs 
Enrolling allies to support 
chosen design 
Standard 
implementation 
Gaining commitment to 
implement the standard 
Prototypes and technology 
trials 
Alternative technology 
evaluations 
Creating a common 
understanding with the 
implementers about the 
specifications and the vision 
behind the specifications 
 
 
Designing alternative 
implementation plans and 
negotiating implementation 
paths 
Enrolling different groups 
that are necessary to get the 
standard implemented 
Technology 
introduction 
based on 
standard 
Technology design and 
introduction for large scale 
uptake 
Creating a vision of what the 
product means for adopters 
 
Developing and negotiating 
business cases for adopters 
 
Table 1.  Standardization and Stage Models   
 
Standardization as Design 
Analyzing standardization from the view-point of design is critical to understanding how 
standards qua technical specifications emerge.  During the design phase, actors plan and commit 
to a specific, new and innovative course of action. Such efforts can range from small design 
steps, such as the design of a specification for a critical component in a GSM phone like a speech 
codec to designs that involve a broad trajectory of innovation, e.g., the service model underlying 
a GSM system. Every such step involves generating, evaluating and choosing between different 
technical and (socio-technical) options (Williams and Edge 1996, p.866). 
Accordingly, standardization as design involves “finding occasions for making a decision, 
finding possible courses of action, choosing among courses of action” (Simon 1977) that are 
continuously mediated by various representations of technical specifications (artifacts). Standard 
producers seek to master the complexity of designs through a “divide and conquer” approach by 
engaging in the following three phases of design: 1) intelligence - making sense of the 
environment and attributing meaning to actions and conditions that call for a design decision; 2) 
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design3 - inventing, developing, and analyzing possible courses of action through crafting 
technical specifications; 3) choice - selecting a particular course of action from those available 
design options.  For example, in the case of GSM, actors had to invent and analyze several 
options for speech codes or coding methods and at some point make a choice between them. This 
process was initiated by the need to meet specific envisioned needs that related to cost, speech 
quality or other use parameters. 
Design anticipates that during negotiation each actor weights design alternatives against a 
set of criteria that may cover economic, political, social and technological criteria.  These criteria 
describe reasons an actor can give for choosing one option. At the same time they signal 
reflective announcements of background sense-making processes. Such rationales may include 
maximization of economic profits. For instance, during the choice whether to standardize or not, 
an actor may consider whether intra technology competition will be more profitable than inter 
technology competition (Besen and Farell 1994). From the viewpoint of negotiation, actors’ 
designs anticipate others’ designs and seek to change the selection criteria between designs. For 
example, in the case of GSM, many proposals for specific components of the system like speech 
codecs were at the same time responses to other existing proposals or attempts to develop new 
criteria by which to evaluate these components. 
While ultimately every actor has to individually commit to a design, in a multi-actor 
setting, several mechanisms can be exploited to coordinate designs. For example, Farrell and 
Saloner (1988) analyzed how market, committee and hybrid mechanisms support the 
coordination of multiple actors.4 This raises the need to distinguish between alternative design 
modes that describe the governance mechanisms through which a design is produced (see also 
Benkler 2001). The mechanism could be voting by majority, consensus, consent, etc. These can 
be supported by structuring mechanisms that enable distribution design like modularity of 
designs, their granularity or cost of communications (Benkler 2001). This links the design 
continually with negotiation because there are specific arrangements and negotiation tactics that 
can help reach and enforce agreement on designs. 
 
Standardization as Sense-Making 
Weick (1995) defines sense-making as a process of invention or the creation of a sense 
that results from an individuals,’ or a community’s response to changes in an environment. For 
him, sense-making is mostly re-active in that actors try to make sense of past events and 
situations, thereby becoming oriented with the current environment. In the context of 
standardization, this definition must be expanded because much of the sense-making in 
standardization is proactive; it is about attributing a meaning to a not-yet-invented technology. 
Much of this is based on proactive readings of past events and exposures to specific technologies 
and their uses. But it is also a question of expanding the “horizon” (Gadamer 1975), an effort 
that enables actors to become aware of the prejudices they bring to encounters with the 
technology.  As a result, they become aware of these prejudices, begin to expand their limits of 
                                                 
3 Simon calls this design as his model is driven by the decision making metaphor. On some occasions, however, he 
equates decision making with design so there is no contradiction in using the term design in the first meaning. 
4 The episodes and locations of design can also change. In most cases of open or inter-organizational 
standardization, some design is carried out by individual actors within the organization while some design can be 
carried out within the standardization meetings and committees or in specific locations that have been established to 
carry out the design. This analysis is, however, beyond the scope of the paper. 
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the language and thinking and ultimately become open to new meanings that can be attributed to 
the technology. Hence, sense-making in standardization is about reading the history of 
experiences and encounters with technology in a new context which calls for new sense-making 
and the creation of a new technological and social world. 
 In the context of standardization, sense-making results in creating and enacting novel 
frames of reference and meaning in relation to potential and produced designs, processes, or 
actors. It comprises transforming and renouncing beliefs, cognitive elements, behaviors and 
standards of evaluation (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1993; Karnoe and Garud 2001); it is a 
mindful deviation from established frames of reference (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2000). 
Actors also constantly rationalize what they are doing in relation to this image based on 
conflicting and uncertain information (Weick 1993, p.635; Latour 1995; Callon 1986). 
 During standardization, meanings are ambiguous and fluid. The standard can accordingly 
take varying shapes and drastically change over time (Garud and Karnøe 2001). These 
significations embody ideas about a possible space of design. For example, with mobile phones 
such significations involved establishing a new vision of wireless service that consisted of 
mobile phones, antennas, switches, batteries and telephony networks (Haug 2002) that deviated 
significantly from the established model of wire-line telephony. These technologies had to be 
associated with visions of their future use that, in the early stages, involved scenarios of using the 
mobile telephony through the same use process as traditional telephony with the additional 
feature of supporting mobility across networks (Haug 2002). This was later on replaced and 
expanded with radically different use scenarios like personal telephone numbers, separation of 
telephone terminals and service etc. At the same time, the economic implications of planned 
wireless systems had to be envisioned based on future technology that did not currently exist. 
The creation of such scenarios expands alternative design spaces, thus creating permanent 
tensions within the dominant design framework ((Fransman 1999) calls these visions). 
Sense-making takes place in all stages of standardization including the adoption and use 
of the technology due to its “interpretive flexibility” (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1993). The need 
for interpretation, the creation of a new sense of what the technology is about and what its 
economic implications are dominate the early phases of standardization. Later negotiations, 
surprises and novel technological opportunities, use experiences and economic information force 
actors to continuously question their established frame and continuously develop new readings. 
 
Standardization as Negotiation 
Standardization involves developing a new repertoire for technology use, for assigning 
roles to others in such repertoires, and for trying to in Latour’s term(Latour 1995) enroll them . 
When these repertoires are formulated, relationships with others must be re-evaluated. It takes 
place whenever an actor positions himself (or itself) to be a part of the network that results from 
standardization or tries to become disassociated from it, i.e., their identities and roles become 
constantly re-negotiated and redefined. Actors need therefore to continually rethink, or make 
sense of,, their relationships with others so that the network implied by the standard permits its 
mobilization (Hanseth, Monteiro, and Halting 1996). Thus, mobilizing  or “performing” the 
actor-network as a part of a sense-making process creates the negotiation space for actors in 
which they relate the designs to actors and to their different interpretations of the technology 
(Callon 1986; Latour 1995). By establishing sufficient commonality in interests and  thereby 
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mobilizing  the actor-network often demands the ability to compromise5, and thereby reach an 
agreement (Weick 1995, p.43) in the form of a standard. During negotiation actors bargain the 
distribution of future inputs and outputs to reach an agreement in relation to the designs that have 
emerged. This normally takes the form of choosing specific designs, identifying associated 
intellectual property rights and their nature (see e.g., Bekkers 2001) and agreeing on the 
normative framework that defines commitments and obligations of different parties. Such 
negotiation involves, at the same time, the capability to envision, connect and fix a socio-
technical network, which “inscribes” the chosen agreement (Latour 1995) and distributes and 
maintains specific rights and obligations for different actors and their relationships to 
technology. For example, in the case of wireless technology standardization, agreements on 
specific compatibility requirements in critical network interfaces (terminal, base station, switch, 
backbone network connection and switch) have to be agreed upon in the technical specification.  
Concurrently, associated property rights and their implications for the possible commitments, 
obligations and rights of different parties must be observed. This implies that all actors who had 
an interest over those interfaces including regulators (frequencies and radio interface), terminal 
manufacturers, telecommunication manufacturers, chip-makers, operators and wire-line system 
standard developers have to be enrolled and a specific normative framework defining their 
relationships must be established6. 
Each actor seeks to maximize his benefits in “coming to an agreement” that during sense-
making was only imagined, but now has to be embedded into the material and social network. 
But because the envisioned world implicated by the imagined solutions is not real or fixed, it is 
continually up for grabs: “The entities identified and the relationships envisaged have not been 
yet tested. The scene is set for a series of trials of strength whose outcomes will determine the 
solidity of … the problematization” (Callon 1986, p.207). These trials of strength translate the 
concerns of one world into those of another and then discipline the translation in order to 
stabilize a socio-technical network (Star 1991). 
 
Empirical Investigation of Standardization Using D-, S-, N Model 
We will now analyze three standardization cases in the telecommunication industry. The 
goals of this analysis are threefold. First, we want to show that standardization processes can be 
broken down into D-S-N activities and involve a dynamic interplay between one another. 
Empirical evidence from the cases helps illustrate the detailed working of design, sense-making, 
and negotiation in standardization efforts. Second, we want to show that, by applying the D-S-N 
model, we can analyze standardization processes in terms of complexity and recursion. We seek 
to illustrate how a singular D- activity can be expanded to include complex recursive process 
structures. Third, the case studies enable us to contrast real world standardization processes with 
normative process models of standardization that often depict standardization processes as linear. 
 
                                                 
5 From the viewpoint of game theory not all standardization negotiations are zero-sum games and hence there is not 
always a need to compromise or make trade-offs. 
6 This does not exclude the possibility that in some situations the process evolves as quid pro bono and is based on 
what Benkler (2001) calls “peer production,” which has been widely adopted in the open source community. This 
would be one different kind of normative framework with different types of normative implications. 
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Methodology 
Our use of case studies was motivated by both our concern for process analysis and 
simultaneous theory building. While in this paper we present the cases as illustrations of the 
model we developed, the research process more closely followed grounded theory methods. We 
developed our theoretical arguments through the interplay of data and theory. Our research 
concern was in explaining and understanding highly complex processes that unfold over several 
years. The case based method is uniquely suited to capture the richness and complexity of such 
processes (Yin 1994). 
We selected three cases of standardization from the wireless telecommunications domain. 
This domain was chosen since it often combines elements of formal standardization and de facto 
standardization. For the purpose of this study, we selected the standardization of the analogue 
Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) system and the digital GSM standard, which were the main 
wireless telephone standardization efforts in Europe. The third example deals with the 
development of the short-range radio standard called Bluetooth. This standardization initiative 
had its origins in the independent efforts of several wireless phone manufacturers to develop 
short-range data transfer capability. 
Our cases thoroughly cover various standardization modes on a continuum ranging from 
market driven de-facto standardization to committee driven standardization. The three cases 
differ significantly also in the complexity of the technology involved, the number of industries, 
individuals and firms enrolled and the timeframe assigned to each case. Furthermore, the three 
processes cover the last three decades, namely, the 70s, 80s and 90s, during which organizational 
structures of standardization organizations and participating actors have changed significantly. 
This has inevitably led to changes in the underlying processes, including the inter- and intra-
organizational standardization processes. For a more detailed description of these cases, see 
appendix 1. Key features of each case are outlined in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
 
 
Case 
Type of 
standard/fora 
Size of fora7, 
persons 
Cultural settings Time frame, 
years 
1. NMT Committee, de-facto 10-30 Nordic, homogeneous 10+ 
2. GSM Committee, de-jure 30-100 European, heterogeneous 10+ 
3. Wireless 
link 
Alliance, de-facto 15 Cross-continental, 
heterogeneous 
2 
Table 2.  Cases Summary 
 
We collected a rich data set on these cases through several methods. First we conducted 
multiple interviews with managers8, who were either key decision makers or standardization 
specialists. In addition to interview data, written documents, memos and public announcements 
from firms involved in the standardization cases were collected and analyzed. Finally, we 
utilized secondary data from industry analysts and trade publications. These additional data 
sources were used to triangulate findings from interviews whenever possible. Concepts were 
used to interpret data and develop an account of the observed behaviors and outcomes. This 
                                                 
7 Number of people in technical committee, responsible for specifications' development 
8 For instance, in the cases of the NMT and GSM cellular telephone systems, former chairmen of the standardization 
committees were interviewed. For confidentiality reasons, we cannot disclose all the names of the managers 
interviewed. 
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strategy of inductive theory discovery, coupled with the continuous interpretation of observations 
through the lenses of outlined theories, allows the development of a detailed theoretical account 
of the phenomena (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser and Strauss 1967) that is analytically generalizable. 
 
Standardization Analysis Using the D-S-N Model 
 
Standardization Processes can be broken into Design, Sense-Making, and Negotiation 
Activities. Our model suggests that each activity is essential for standardization. Sometimes they 
overlap, while in other instances, they can be clearly separated.  Bluetooth provides an example 
of a situation where design, sense-making, and negotiation took place concurrently. During the 
early stages of the standardization process several manufacturers realized that this technology 
could become important for other mobile device manufacturers as well. Independent of each 
other two mobile phone manufacturers contacted a semiconductor manufacturer to discuss the 
possibility to develop a standard that one could utilize across industry boundaries. Facilitated by 
the semiconductor manufacturer the two competitors realized that cooperation would enable a 
creation of a standard would have enough weight in the market. As one interviewee observed: 
 
“With Ericsson we work in the same business area – the phones and the cellular terminal devices. 
We didn’t go to each other to start it. We went originally both to INTEL. But what was important 
in forming the consortium, all the companies who joined had developed the vision that in order to 
make this really successful, we would need to have a common and open standard for it. Something 
that is proprietary for one company well it might gain some market and it would bring some 
benefits to that company but it would not really make it widely adopted.“ 
 
Based on this sense-making, the three companies started negotiations about whom else to 
include in the standardization work. Different alternatives were considered to trade-off the 
difficulties of negotiating a standard with a large number of companies while at the same time 
ensuring wide industry acceptance. The three initial companies  chose that the standard should be 
created by a small network to avoid problems of having to negotiate details of the standard with 
a large number of actors. This  would delay the process and make it more difficult to “perform 
the network”.. This decision led these companies to invite additional companies from the 
portable PC market to join the consortium.9 The choice of these companies showed how they 
related their sense-making  and attribution of the significance of the technology to their own 
interests of getting it accepted and move it fast into the market. 
The  simultaneous need for integrating negotiation and a design space into the 
standardization effort shows how technological, social, economic and political rationales became 
intertwined through the intersections of the three activities. The two computer companies that 
joined early on the consortium were selected not only for their technological and market 
strength, but also for their good relationships with the semiconductor company. In the words of 
one interviewee: 
 
“Certainly these two companies are driving the technology and the new features in their devices. 
One thing of course is that they have good and direct links with INTEL. They are important 
                                                 
9  Also other manufacturers where contacted to participate in the standardization effort but  they ultimately declined.  
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customers for INTEL. There are other companies who are using AMD chips for example - buying 
chips from INTEL’s archrival. I think that these companies, if I know it right, are also good 
friends of INTEL. In that sense they are politically correct.” 
 
Whereas technological strength and design capability clearly plays a key role in the 
choice of actors – the early configuration of the actor network –, their impact on the economic 
viability of the future standard, their current economic and social ties and the avoidance of 
political conflict in the alliance all strongly affected the final  choice. 
While the above example shows how sense-making, negotiation and design  become 
seamlessly fused, the following vignette that Thomas Haug — a secretary of the NMT group and 
later a chairman of the GSM committee— recalls shows how these three activities had  to 
sometimes be separated in order to allow progress towards closure in standardization. Based on 
the results of the early sense-making process, NMT developers had to refine their specifications: 
 
“We realized that we would probably have a lot of mistakes, when we wrote specifications, so we 
sent out some early versions. And we invited the suppliers to the discussions. It was not very 
successful – it was a total failure! It was [a failure] because we invited all the manufacturers at 
once to a big meeting. We presented our ideas to them, and got no questions. Because, of course 
the fact we had not thought of, that no one would really run the risk of disclosing to his competitor 
what he was thinking of. But later on, we started to invite them one by one. And that was very 
fruitful… And after each meeting we issued a new set of questions and answers, without 
mentioning who put the questions to us. And we gave a list of answers that we’ll give them.  And 
that was the information they had.” 
 
In this quotation, the negotiations about technical details had to be separated from sense-
making in terms of their meanings for different companies and the resulting configuration of the 
actor-network. To achieve this separation, the information exchange was later on organized in a 
way that enabled the system developers to crosscheck any particular technological solution for 
feasibility with other manufacturers while avoiding disclosure of immediate answers. Thus, those 
meetings were a punctuated series of design and negotiation processes aimed at refining the 
standard based on the outcomes of initial sense-making processes. 
 
Design, Sense-making, and Negotiation can unfold in a Non-linear Fashion. We argued 
above that D,S,N sequences do not necessarily unfold in a linear fashion. Rather, any activity can 
trigger any other activity. In the following vignette, the standardization committee had to resolve 
conflict over different radio coding and air interface solutions. These decisions form the 
cornerstone of any wireless telephony solution and are thus a seed for both technical and political 
maneuvering. In 1987, the GSM group reached an impasse between a Franco-German radio 
coding method and a Nordic design10. This choice implied different tradeoffs between quality 
and the cost for user terminals and suggested a significant impact on the network architecture 
and cost. French and German PTT representatives privately favored the Nordic plan because it 
made sense from the viewpoint of trading between quality and cost. Yet, their governments 
opposed this choice due to the R&D investment made by French and German governments and 
manufacturers in the specific technology option proposed. Due to the dispute over the coding 
methods and air interfaces, the whole standardization process came to a halt for nearly six 
                                                 
10 It must be noted that the radio coding method is an essential part of a standardization process as it affects the 
efficiency and voice quality of the radio link (circuit) between the mobile terminal and the base station. 
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months. The Franco-German technology option, however, was abruptly abandoned when 
Germany changed its position and endorsed the Nordic plan (Manninen et al. 2000): 
 
“In February 1987 we had a meeting, which ended in disagreement. Germans and French wanted a 
wide-band system, and the rest of the Europe wanted a narrow-band system… The technical 
people in GSM agreed we should have this narrow-band system. It was in interest of 
compatibility. But political people dictated the opinions of PTTs. And they had a lot of political 
reasons. They’ve spent a lot of money on the experimental systems and they wanted something to 
get for their money”… 
 
In the quotation above we see how parties, while engaged in the negotiation of 
technological designs, attempt to enroll allies and use powerful fixers. This negotiation triggers 
sense-making related to investments made during the resource allocations that took place earlier. 
The continuation of this vignette shows how, after new sense-making and bringing new 
rationalities into the table that helped to overcome the earlier fixated reading of the situation, a 
new round of negotiations took place so that the process could achieve closure (Manninen and 
Fomin 1999): 
 
“In June 1987 all these difficulties had been resolved, The German and the French ministers had 
met. They had agreed, after some gambling perhaps, that in the interests of compatibility in 
Europe, we could not possibly have a French-German system [which would be different from the 
rest of Europe] right in the middle of the continent… And then in order to give them something 
for their money, we agreed to switch from one mode to another mode for digital transfer. It was a 
face-saving, I think.” 
 
The example above also shows how economic, political and technical criteria figure into 
agreements while actors have shifted flexibly between D-, S- and N- activities. While the 
narrow-band solution was clearly superior from the technological and cost perspectives, it 
entailed economical losses of investments in R&D carried out by German and French companies. 
The switch to another mode for digital transfer – a design compromise made during the 
negotiations – made this decision politically bearable. These compromises were necessary 
simply because the multilateral maximization of all benefits is not possible – even in the case of 
competing technological designs. Another important implication of the example is that the 
choice that is seemingly a minor part of a design creates important path dependencies for the 
later designs (Liebowitz and Margolis 2000). 
 
To Proceed the Cycle of Design, Sense-Making, and Negotiation needs to be Complete. Any  
standardization process must successfully reach closure in order to become a standard. 
Moreover, this must occur for all three activities. Standard makers (what is the antecedent of 
“that?” Unclear what you mean here) must also reach closure at any specific stage of 
standardization if they want to proceed. For instance, the initial resource allocation sense-making 
efforts center on forming an understanding of what resources and skills are necessary to develop 
a standard in terms of the size of the project and the type of resources needed. Bluetooth 
standardization provides a good example of how such sense-making takes place. Early on, the 
original founders of the Bluetooth alliance discussed which partner should enter the core to 
ensure the effective development of specifications. Based on the technological vision (sense-
making) that Bluetooth would constitute an initiative that would cut across industry boundaries, 
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the firms were trying to find a structure that would provide necessary resources, but keep the 
actual implementation arrangement simple. The following quote underscores this: 
 
“Of course there was the discussion what is the optimum size for this kind of consortium. First, it 
has to be so big and it has to have so strong players that it really has the market and has the weight 
on the media and all those things that are important. Second, if it is very big at the beginning there 
is the threat that it makes the actual work more difficult and more bureaucratic. If in every meeting 
there are representatives of twenty companies it quickly turns out that each of them has different 
interests and conflicting interests and so it’s making the progress of the actual standard slower. 
The idea was that there had to be players from the different parts of the game so from the telecom 
and from the computing industry. And players which are strong enough that their market shares in 
their business area is big enough so that it has a real meaning when the standard is finalized.” 
 
Resource allocation not only requires developing a common understanding of what 
resources are needed but also must lead to the actors taking on roles and committing to 
contribute the required resources. This endeavor requires a negotiation process in which the 
resource requirements are matched not only with the resources and capabilities of the actors, but 
also with their preferences. In the Bluetooth case, for instance, Intel opted to act as the process 
facilitator due to its longstanding experience with de-facto standardization initiatives. In contrast, 
Ericsson was prominent during the market introduction phase as a result of the larger amount of 
available resources. To be able to proceed, the actors need to commit resources then decide if the 
outcome of the negotiation process is sufficient to proceed. 
 
D-S-N are Recursively Organized. As noted above, D-S-N activities can be decomposed 
themselves recursively into sense-making, negotiation and design cycles. The practice of 
representing standardization processes as recursive processes allows us to scale our analysis 
using different levels of detail. While the overall design, sense-making, or negotiation cycle is 
simple in its structure, further breaking up the activities allows for the development of complex 
and fine-grained descriptions. 
The recursive nature of design, sense-making, and negotiation can be seen in the 
following example from the NMT standardization. The NMT group was formed during a Nordic 
Teleconference held in June 1969 in Kabelvåg of Norway, during which time Sweden, without 
any prior notice, announced its intention to start developing a system for mobile services. This 
proposal was accepted during the same meeting as a Pan-Nordic initiative. The short 
initialization stage left many organizational and technical questions open. The primary goal of 
the group, according to the mandate, was not to design an integrated technical product, but to 
create a common and compatible Nordic service. Because of its broad scope, the service was 
open to negotiation for an extended period, while different alternatives for the service concept 
and its technical feasibility were designed and negotiated. 
A critical issue in the service-related design was whether the system should be manual or 
automatic. To make the choice, several viable design alternatives had to be developed and 
subsequently negotiated among the participants. Developing these alternatives required sense-
making of what manual or automatic systems would mean in terms of service, cost and 
technological implementation and its feasibility. Toivola (1992) recalls that although the starting 
point in the requirements was that the network should be automatic, the committee had to ensure 
that this option would be realistic. Designing an automatic system was not something taken for 
granted in the early 70s and estimating the costs associated with such a system was anything but 
straightforward. Both manual and automatic alternatives were designed while the actors derived 
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probable system configurations and estimated their costs, finally choosing two alternatives that 
could be compared in terms of cost and technical requirements. 
 
“Six years after the original decision, the requirements were fixed when in its report in January 
1975 the NMT work group analyzed the cost of both manual and automatic networks. A difference 
of SEK 3 million was found to favor of the automatic system. Ultimately, the choice [of automatic 
system] made by the NMT group shaped its success when it was introduced in the beginning of 
1980s in that this choice proved was crucial for roaming.” (Manninen et al. 2000) 
 
The above vignette shows how within the design, sense-making, and negotiation cycle, 
the negotiation aspect can be broken down into another design, sense-making, and negotiation 
cycle (or two for each alternative). 
 
Comparing D-S-N and Linear Standardization Models. Our suggestion that design, sense-
making, and negotiation do not always unfold in a linear manner can be extended to 
standardization processes at large. Bluetooth provides an example of how at the first meeting of 
the core companies of the Bluetooth alliance, sense-making was occurring that affected the 
whole standardization process. In the meeting, managers created a common understanding of the 
cornerstones for process initiation, resource allocation and market introduction (see quotation on 
p.42), and concluded that, to achieve efficient development, a small group of standard sponsors 
would be ideal, but such sponsors should be from both the telecommunications and computer 
industries: 
 
“And we were looking for companies, which would hold enough market share in their business 
area that they could pull the market but that we could also survive with only these on board. We 
started from an assumption what if these are the only companies that are actually going to use it, is 
still so widely deployed that even these companies would make it successful on the market. When 
it is successful on the market then there are probably other companies joining the game.” 
 
This vignette shows how standardization can unfold in a non-linear fashion. It further 
shows that the processes of standards design and negotiation and the diffusion of artifacts based 
on those agreements are tightly interwoven and cannot (and should not) be separated in the 
analysis. Our cases suggest that the concept of separating design, sense-making and the 
negotiation of standards implicit in the normative standardization process does not reflect the 
actual standardization processes. Consequently, this makes them less useful in explaining why 
specific standardization processes succeed or fail. This is not to say that linear process models 
are useless, rather they are boundary objects used for sense-making and negotiating resource 
allocation and coordination tasks.  
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Discussion 
 
 A process theory of standardization, outlined above enables us to theorize over 
standardization processes and their outcomes. In the following, we shall pick up four issues 
related to standardization theory: 1) features of the proposed theory and its relationship to 
existing theoretical frameworks; 2) how this theory compares to current process accounts in 
standardization; 3) an analysis of the timing issues of standardization related to the theory; and 4) 
alternative uses of the D-S-N model in the study of standardization. 
 
Nature of D-S-N theories 
 
Process Theories 
We believe that investigations that draw upon these notions help formulate empirical 
accounts that are more faithful to available empirical evidence and can provide more rigorous 
analyses of why and how emergent standardization processes come into being. They also provide 
a means of analyzing standardization episodes in a flexible and comprehensive manner, which 
helps cast our conceptual net widely and allows us to capture nuances of specific standardization 
episodes. 
 Theoretical formulations and models built upon these concepts can produce process 
theories (Mohr 1982; Markus and Robey 1988). These accounts are not state oriented variance 
theories, which are capable of defining necessary and sufficient reasons for Y to happen given X, 
i.e., X always precedes Y, or causes Y to happen. In such variance theories, it is also assumed 
that the outcome will invariably occur when the necessary conditions are present and sufficient. 
Such conditions are normally framed in terms of variables and dressed in an inference on the 
order of, if X then Y, if more X then more Y.  Process theories, instead, analyze episodes of 
discrete events or outcomes X1, X2, X3,.. X n in a manner, which shows that a string of specific set 
of events X2, X3,.. X n is necessary for a specific outcome Yi, but that these conditions are not 
sufficient in that such outcomes may not occur given the sequence of events. Moreover, there 
can be other sets of events X1, X2, and X3 that can yield the same outcome. For example, some 
wireless standards have become widely successful through very different configurations of 
events. There are some fundamental elements to all of them, such as changes in regulations 
systems (competition), the market focus in standard specification and service introduction and 
the timing of agreement with relation to technological development (not too early, not too late).  
Yet, no set of conditions can be said to be at the same time both necessary and sufficient to 
produce successful standards. 
Another way to build process theories is to focus on the lack of specific events in specific 
episodes that do not result in Yi. From this we can infer that if there is not an X2, X3,.. X n we 
will not produce Yi. For example, a lack of market feedback and a purely technological focus 
(i.e. lack of sense-making or wrongly focused sense-making) in standardization processes have 
always resulted in standardization failures. Whereas the first group of process theories is mostly 
retrospective- they help explain why something occurred as it did, the second group will also 
allow for weak forms of prediction in the sense that we can, in most cases, exclude certain 
outcomes if certain conditions are not met. This, however, cannot be extended into a strong 
explanation in a form similar to, if X then Y or if more X then more Y. For example, more sense-
making or more market focus will not necessarily lead to a successful standard. Hence, an 
important element in analyzing such event sequences is to identify random events and chance 
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(serendipity), or a specific sequencing of events, which change the trajectory (Arthur 1989) of 
the process. Therefore, outcomes in such theories are predictable from the knowledge of 
processes, which are in our case framed as combinations and configurations of D, S, and N 
events over time. 
A second type of analysis that can be carried out with the process models is to analyze 
what specific sets of events {X2, X3,.. X n}, {X1, X2, X3} are likely to be associated with specific 
outcomes Yi. For example, our analysis showed that the only sufficient condition for achieving a 
successful standardization outcome was to reach a closure in three activities: D, S, and N. Over 
time, these analyses can obtain patterns of configurations through identifying a common set of 
events {X1, X2} that co-exist in sequences of events. A third type of analysis in which we can 
engage is to try to understand why X n happened when X k had happened before. This may 
expand the analysis to include descriptions of states and their configurations which explain why 
X n happened instead of X m after X k had happened before.  For example, both NMT, and GSM 
standardization processes were successful while some other standardization processes like CNET 
in Germany or PDC in Japan were not (Lyytinen and Fomin 2002). In all these cases a closure 
was achieved in D-activities (the systems worked and could be implemented), but these were 
associated with very different prior configurations of S and N activities due to institutional 
traditions and industry organizations. These different configurations lead over time to different 
standardization process outcomes. 
 
Features of D-S-N Theories 
In our view, a good standardization process theory should be able to explain why a 
specific outcome did emerge (success or failure) and why other alternatives were excluded. It 
enables us to compose a story about why acts, events and structure were organized in the way 
they were and how they co-produced the outcome. We can formulate our explanations with some 
level of causality in that we can argue what comes first, how it affects what will follow (Sutton 
and Staw 1995) and how timing will affect the process. The theory helps reveal underlying 
processes in order to explicate systematic reasons of why something did occur. As noted, we can 
also use it predict why something did not occur given the circumstances. 
There is no best way to develop a theory. Its features depend on the nature of causality 
assumed, its scope and the specific goals of the researchers (Weick 1984). Consequently, 
theories differ significantly with respect to the dimensions of accuracy, generality, simplicity, 
explanatory power, and completeness. Here, there are important tradeoffs to make. As Weick 
(1984, p. 116) notes, no theory can meet all these criteria simultaneously: “General accurate 
theories are complex, general simple theories are inaccurate, and simple accurate theories have 
no generality.” 
We show how theories based on D-S-N constructs meet these criteria. As can be seen in 
the table, D-S-N based theories are quite distinct and complementary to the existing theoretical 
analyses of standardization. These theories usually aim to be general, complex and have varying 
modes of accuracy. Conversely, theoretical analyses derived from D-S-N seek to be accurate, 
scalable and operate with general and few concepts. They have low empirical generalizability 
and their additional downside is that they yield complex models and analyses due to their process 
and constructive nature.  They offer answers to questions of “why” and “how.” 
Overall, we feel that the theory effectively meets the criteria for the specific theory 
choice in the context of developing process theories of standardization. We have traded 
generality against accuracy and simplicity in response to the need to understand and explain 
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complex processes. In terms of theoretical orientation and the nature of organizing concepts, our 
theoretical position is closest to the position adopted in the social construction of the 
technologies research stream. In this regard, there is a deeper sense of theorizing. to which we 
aspire here, that we call substantive or ontological theorizing. Such modes of theorizing help us 
to understand the ingredients that make something possible or workable in the way that Simon’s 
theory of decision making (Simon 1977) explains what makes decision-making possible. It has a 
rather small predictive capability, but carries strong normative implications of what one should 
not do. 
 
Theory 
feature 
Description D-S-N based theory 
Accuracy The extent to which the theory describes 
in detail variations and specific features 
of the studied phenomena 
Better than existing standardization theories. Helps 
formulate more detailed and close-up models of 
standardization processes and their outcomes11. 
Generality The extent to which the theory applies to 
the whole population (Analytical 
generality). The extent to which the 
observations and findings are generalized 
over the whole sample of possible 
observations (Empirical generality). 
Good analytical generality 
Weaker empirical generality due to small sample 
sizes and causality logic 
Enables scaling with complexity and yields higher 
degrees of generality with complex models 
(recursivity, hierarchical organization) 
Simplicity How many concepts and their 
relationships are embedded in the theory. 
Are these concepts distinct, well defined 
and intuitively clear? 
Based on few simple concepts 
Organizing principles and relationships are 
complex and the main challenge is theory 
development 
Can yield complex theoretical models from these 
simple and few concepts12
Challenge is to integrate good descriptive 
indicators and data points with each component 
The main components integrate and organize 
heterogeneous streams of theory and research 
 
Explanatory 
power 
Can the theory define necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something to 
happen (strong)? 
Can the theory identify sufficient 
conditions for something to happen 
(weak)? 
Weak explanatory power 
Denies possibility for prediction in the strict sense 
(if A then B). A is only necessary for B to happen 
Enables explanatory accounts of why something 
happened when a set of events was identified 
Enables statistical generalizability over a set of 
process patterns, which lead to specific outcomes 
Completeness To what extent does the theory cover all 
necessary elements to explain why A was 
produced in all possible circumstances? 
No clear criteria to judge completeness 
Institutions (stable configurations of actor 
networks) and power (the way in which actors can 
be influenced in the network) are implicit in the 
model.  
Table 3.  General Features of D-S-N Theories 
 
 
                                                 
11 The model is in fact an outcome of the frustration we felt when trying existing standardization process models, 
which could not explain the phenomena we observed.   
12 This is in clear contrast to most existing standardization models, which yield relatively simple (linear) models out 
from several and complex concepts. 
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A Comparison with Current Accounts of Standardization Processes 
As pointed out above, current standardization research separates standard design as the 
production of a technical specification, its choice as an economic or political game, and its 
diffusion in the market place as driven by economic or managerial prerogatives. These are 
treated as conceptually distinct, separate and necessarily distinguishable moments in the 
standardization. The basis of our theory denies the possibility of such separation for other than 
limited analytical purposes. Therefore, current theoretical analyses of standardization should also 
be more aware of the obvious limitations of this standing.  Such separate analyses often ignore, 
in particular, the necessary sense-making related to both design and negotiation situations, which 
is largely driven by the actors’ market perceptions. For example, AT&T (King and West 2002) 
failed to move successfully with wireless standardization and implementation despite its deep 
pockets and technological lead. This was caused by the fact that Ma Bell’s management 
consistently perceived the market place through the lenses of universal (wireline) service that 
were driven by the need to sustain its monopoly rights. Despite this, its technology design 
(AMPS) was the most widely used 1st generation wireless standard and adopted by other 
aggressive entrants like McCaw. 
 Another issue in this study is to reveal the fragility of all three closures: design closure; 
significance closure; and negotiation closure. This fragility can be caused by a numerous factors 
and events that change designs, yield new interpretations, and transform interests and power 
balances. Because of this fragility, we face high rates of standardization failures and suffer crises 
in traditional standardization bodies that are not designed to address such levels of process 
complexity and uncertainty. 
 
Timing of Standardization Processes 
 Several empirical studies of standardization episodes and processes suggest that the 
timing of events in reaching an agreement over the technical specification and the way in which 
this agreement is translated into a socio-technical network are of critical importance in the 
success of standardization (Haug 2002; Lyytinen and Fomin 2002; King and West 2002). Yet, 
most theoretical work on standardization research has not accounted for this observation.  
Economics and management literature has looked at standard choices from the viewpoint of a 
singular adopter and analyzed his or her welfare functions in light of network externalities. This 
approach largely ignores the actual processes of reaching an agreement (Farrell and Saloner 
1986; David and Greenstein 1990). Likewise, most social construction of technology literature 
does not include the concepts that capture standardization processes as dynamic phenomena. 
Instead, it reduces processes to sense-making failures and identifies the specific qualities that 
influence the process outcomes (Williams and Edge 1996; Pinch and Bijker 1987). Finally, 
negotiation literature analyzes mostly static features such as the strength of the network, but pay 
only limited attention to the dynamics involved in creating the network. We believe that the D-S-
N model more effectively highlights time related activities that build these socio-technical 
networks and leads to analysis of patterns of activities and their relationships. 
The most interesting issue in time based analyses seems to be how time scales and events 
unfold along each set of activities and how they are co-related. Typical questions we could ask 
include the following: How and when do different and deviating meanings for technology begin 
to emerge? How and when do specific designs, technologies and architectures emerge, and how 
do they enroll specific technical communities? How and when do these become stabilized in 
designs that enter negotiations arenas and how do the socio-technical networks become 
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stabilized? How are all these events synchronized, if at all? Though social construction of 
technology literature has analyzed many of these issues from a specific standpoint, it has not so 
far investigated the dynamics and time related aspects of the standardization.  There is some 
analysis of critical events and time points when gatekeepers and their powers are highlighted 
(Latour 1995). These models are clearly still limited in outlining the dynamics of 
standardization. They ignore what actors actually know and how they make sense of the 
standards in specific time points in relation to markets or technological evolution. They also 
assume that actors know the other actors and their agendas. Our model suggests that such 
assumptions in most cases are untenable because sense-making is always frail. One way to 
address such issues is to ask the following: What are the limits of sense-making and is there 
some reasonable closure in a specific time frame with a given set of actors? How dynamic is the 
set of actors and can they agree on the standard due to differences in their cognitive framing and 
interests? What are their choice rationales and will they change or can they be negotiated during 
the process? This poses specific dilemmas for actors who are engaged in standard negotiation. 
When they enter the negotiation game too early it is easy to agree as the actors do not know to 
what they are agreeing.  This may not necessarily be important, but it is difficult to make choices 
as technology does not make sense ; if actors enter too late it is easy to make sense but difficult 
to agree as the actors’ agendas can vary, the technology is fixed and the sense-making has  been 
closed.  There are also different ways to affect the final design like influencing sense-making, 
influencing others’ goals and utility functions or using power and increasing dependencies. 
 
Future Applications of D-S-N Model to Analyze Standardization 
 The outlined standardization model above is not a governing law theory about 
standardization but suggests a narrative of standardizations (DiMaggio 1995). It neither explains 
nor excludes everything. Rather, it merely suggests a set of concepts and their relationships along 
with a set of analytical implications that we deem necessary and fruitful in theorizing about 
standardization processes. More specific standardization theories would imply a set of specific 
types of relationships between specific sets of D-, S-, N- configurations and specific outcomes. 
This may require refinement and expansion of concepts and a further formulation of specific 
constructs. At the same time, further theorizing requires the development of specific 
relationships between observed phenomena and their change. We see, however, that suggested 
concepts can serve multiple useful roles in developing such process theories. 
 First, they can be used to develop more specific process analysis frameworks to analyze 
standardization processes as non-linear, emergent, and path-dependent processes. Specific 
issues that can be addressed include the following: what types of non-linearity can be observed? 
Do the specific constellations of the activities refer to tipping effects as observed in 
organizational complexity theory (Axelrod and Cohen 2000)?  How can these configurations be 
related to observed non-linear models in the innovation literature (Autio 1997)?  What conditions 
and configurations standards create major deviations from existing dominant designs and create 
new forms of path dependency (Karnoe and Garud 2001)? How are paths and path creation 
activities reflected in process mappings? (These may first involve development of technical skills 
and solutions and related technical architectures and specifications as design path. Second they 
may entail  invention, , transformation and sharing of cognitive schemata over time as a sense-
making path, and third   creation of  of practices, histories and trust among set of standard 
adopters and producers as a negotiation path. Finally standardization implies  development of 
“rules of the game” that govern how standards become “standards” on the institutional path.  
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 Second, the concepts can be used to formulate process theories that explain the failures 
or successes of standardization processes. The concepts of D-S-N can be used to analyze 
specific standardization episodes. Researchers can pose the following questions: How did these 
activities become patterned and how do these patterns relate to standardization success or 
failure? This research would be similar to attempts to develop process theories of organizational 
change or IT implementation (Mohr 1982; Markus and Robey 1988). 
 Third, D-S-N concepts can be used to understand, critique, and expand standardization 
process models from the view point of D-S-N closures. Existing process accounts of 
standardization are both normative and linear. They are based either on product development 
models or regulation metaphors adopted from multilateral negotiations (Schmidt and Werle 
1998). These models try to explain standardization as linear refinements over one dimension of 
the standardization process (design or negotiation) while ignoring the other two. We argue that 
such models are inadequate because they separate design (as covered by the product 
development part), negotiation (as governed by the regulation metaphors), and sense-making 
(which is currently neglected). If and when processes are nonlinear, all these elements should be 
accounted for to some extent in the process. To this end, the D-S-N model can be used to 
develop more contingency based process templates depending on the nature of D,S and N  event 
configurations and the likelihood of failing in one or several of the standardization activities. 
 Fourth, using D-S-N concepts, we can develop empirically grounded accounts of specific 
standardization processes that allow expanded theorizing. Use of the D-S-N concepts enables 
researchers to formulate specific process theories from standardization data. For example, 
consortia based industries led standardization models like Bluetooth, 3G (3GPPP) or Java 
development may lead to different ways of configuring, orchestrating and organizing D, S, and N 
activities when compared with the traditional standardization processes followed in ITU or ISO 
(Schmidt and Werle 1998).  There is also more emphasis on peer based specification and 
production modes (Benkler 2001) that negate the need to maintain intellectual property rights on 
the innovations and recognize them as part of the standardization process.  To do this we must 
develop sharper constructs for identifying different types of D, S, and N activities and  for 
distinguishing between specific institutional ways to organize and coordinate standardization. 
We must also develop categories that identify specific contingencies that influence the 
distribution and configuration of D, S, and N activities over a set of standardization processes. 
For example, it may be that D-, S-, N- activities have the same properties as Weick’s (Weick 
1984) theory properties. Standard setters cannot pursue them all at the same time and one of 
them may have to be sacrificed in the process of making a standard successful. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have outlined a process theory of standardization. It draws upon and 
integrates several separate lines of inquiry into a dynamic analysis of standardization processes.  
It is not a theory, but a framework that enables theorizing over standardization processes in 
specific contexts. We demonstrate in the paper how it can be used to orchestrate empirical 
analyses of specific events during standardization processes. We provide evidence of the strength 
of D-S-N based analysis by analyzing vignettes of three complex standardization processes and 
by explaining their proceeding using the model. 
We argue that D-S-N informed analyses and theories allow students of standardization to 
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analyze a whole process of standardization as a sequence of events that carry forward acts of 
design, acts of interpretation and sense-making and episodes of negotiation and translation. All 
these events are recursively organized into a web of activities that span space and time. These 
concepts highlight the non-linear and complex nature of standardization, which has been 
neglected with past models of standardization. We demonstrate also the specific features of the 
theories that can be generated using the concepts related to D-S-N and compare them with the 
existing theories of standardization. The analysis shows that D-S-N theories trade off differently 
the requirements of generality, accuracy, simplicity and explanatory power. 
 The developed model invites new research on several fronts. First, we need to extend the 
analysis of activities to other standardization processes. Current analysis covered only fragments 
of situations in telecom and wireless standardization. Obvious targets for empirical validation are 
standardization processes outside official standardization bodies (e.g. Java) and emerging 
interoperability standards in IT (like XML, EbXML). These processes may indicate specific 
traits of D-, S- or N activities and their organization that are not present in studied 
telecommunication standards. The work could also be used to understand complex infrastructure 
development in general (see Bergman, King, and Lyytinen in press). There are several specific 
topics in standardization that can be attacked by this line of inquiry including timing and 
dynamical issues, more specific process analysis frameworks for specific standardization arenas. 
In the future we need to focus on analyzing more detailed process patterns in typical 
standardization situations and expand that to a set of standardization processes to analyze 
variance. More work is required in order to integrate institutional aspects into standardization 
process analysis. 
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Appendix 1: Case Overviews 
 
Our first case is the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) system. The case of the NMT 
standard is an excellent example of a successful standard-making process (Fomin and Lyytinen 
2000). There are several reasons why it is an interesting case for analysis. First, it was created at 
the time when there was a market demand for this kind of technology, but the needed technology 
was not yet available (Toivola 1992). Second, it was developed almost at the same time as 
another major cellular telephony standard, namely AMPS13 in the US, but witnessed much 
greater acceptance and success (West 2000). The developers of the NMT system gambled on the 
rapid advance of radio and micro-electronic technology and designed the system "for the future". 
They ignored the fear of a high level of uncertainty due to their ability to anticipate in 1969 that 
what national PTTs14 had was "really a technology for the 60s, and that wouldn't do it for the 
1970s" (Manninen and Fomin 1999). This move necessitated the PTTs to create close 
relationships with otherwise external producers of telephone, radio, and micro-electronics 
equipment. We believe there were important social and cultural implications in the standard 
settings, which facilitated the standard creation process and paved the way for the standard to be 
delivered to the market. 
The second case, the GSM cellular telephony system, is interesting because of the 
European PTTs’ political interests and ambitious aims in the standardization process. Many 
European PTTs shared an opinion already in 1980 that each European country would benefit 
from an introduction of a pan-European system (Bekkers and Smits 1998; Meurling and Jeans 
1994; Toivola 1992). Non-official discussions in Paris in 1980 revealed that CEPT15 would be 
too cumbersome to lead the standardization work (Manninen et al. 2000; Toivola 1992). This 
resulted in establishing Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM), a body subordinated to Committee for 
Coordination and Harmonization (CCH) of CEPT. The goal of GSM  group was to harmonize 
technical and operational specifications for a public mobile system on the 900MHz frequency 
(Toivola 1992). The creation of GSM ended the European fragmentation in the mobile telephony 
and became a leading wireless standard (Mouly and Pautet 1992). Yet, before this was achieved, 
many technical, economical and political challenges had to be resolved. 
The third case involves standardization of short-range radio technology called 
Bluetooth16. Already in the early 1990s, several electronics, information technology and 
telecommunications firms explored possibilities of connecting devices such as mobile phones, 
laptops and peripherals without wires. Several technological alternatives were developed to 
address this challenge. In 1993, IrDA17 was formed to create an infrared data interconnection 
standard. Primarily, companies from the computing and semiconductor industry sponsored this 
standard. At the same time several portable computer manufacturers experimented with radio 
technology to address the problem that infrared technology required a line of sight between 
devices. Yet, to make it widely applicable all manufacturers would have to conform to this 
standard. Therefore, in 1997, five companies announced a consortium to develop and promote an 
industry standard that would use radio technology. The consortium was organized so that these 
                                                 
13 AMPS – Advanced Mobile Phone System. 
14 PTT – Post Telephone Telegraph, usually a state owned monopoly organization providing these service 
15 CEPT – (Fr.) Conférence des Administrations Européenes des Postes et Télécommunications 
16 See http://www.bluetooth.com 
17 IrDA – The Infrared Data Association. 
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five companies would develop the standard while other companies were allowed to join the 
consortium as adopters without any direct influence on the specifications. The initiative has been 
successful in that over 200 firms have committed themselves as adopters to the specification 
when version 1.0 was released in September 1999. 
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